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Over the last two decades, countries like Turkey, Hungary, Venezuela and India<\/a> gave the world a lesson on how democracy can erode into \u201ccompetitive authoritarianism\u201d \u2014 a system in which elections are still meaningful, but leaders manipulate the rules to their own benefit, while systematically violating civil liberties.<\/p>\n Now, we are starting to find out what happens when even partial democracy becomes a significant threat to the authoritarians.<\/p>\n The latest example comes from Turkey, where protests are raging across the country after the arrest of Ekrem Imamoglu, the mayor of Istanbul and the country\u2019s most prominent opposition politician. The government accused him of accepting bribes, rigging bids and misusing citizens\u2019 personal data; he has denied the charges. (Istanbul University also rescinded his diploma<\/a>; holding a university degree is a requirement for Turkish presidential candidates.)<\/p>\n Mr. Imamoglu\u2019s growing popularity had made him a significant contender in Turkey\u2019s next presidential election, and he was jailed pending his trial on the day of his party\u2019s presidential primary. His arrest, experts say, sent a clear message that President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is no longer willing to give the opposition a real chance to win elections.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Mr. Erdogan seems to have recognized that even if he manipulates the system, he may not be able to beat Mr. Imamoglu, said Lisel Hintz, a political scientist at Johns Hopkins University who studies Turkish politics.<\/p>\n \u201cSo this move is an anticipatory move, trying to take the one individual who could potentially challenge Erdogan off the playing field,\u201d she said. \u201cThis is really a clear shift from what we would call competitive authoritarianism to full authoritarianism.\u201d<\/p>\n Turkey has not yet gone as far as countries like Russia, where there is little meaningful political opposition to President Vladimir Putin\u2019s control. But many see the government\u2019s actions as a significant step in that direction.<\/p>\n To understand why this is happening, it is helpful to think about elections as a kind of equation of costs and benefits for authoritarian leaders to solve.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n On one side are the benefits of elections, which are often considerable, even for leaders who are not particularly invested in democratic freedoms. Winning them validates an authoritarian leader\u2019s popularity and power, even if the election was not entirely free or fair. That not only bolsters the government\u2019s legitimacy at home, but also its relationships with other countries. And it sends a powerful signal to elites in the country\u2019s military, business community and other important constituencies that they should continue to support the government.<\/p>\n On the other side of the equation is the obvious risk of holding competitive elections: The incumbent can lose. That appears to be what happened in Venezuela last year, for example, when President Nicol\u00e1s Maduro\u2019s efforts to secure his victory through behind-the-scenes manipulation failed, and his opponent won by a landslide, according to independent observers. Mr. Maduro then clumsily declared victory for himself anyway.<\/p>\n In India, events took a slightly different turn. Prime Minister Narendra Modi tried to weaken the opposition by arresting its leaders, cutting off their access to funds and limiting media freedom. In the end, his party lost its majority in parliament anyway. Mr. Modi remained prime minister, but must now govern in coalition with other parties, considerably limiting his power.<\/p>\n In Turkey, experts say that recent events have made it less attractive for Mr. Erdogan to allow competitive elections.<\/p>\n The potential cost of a relatively open election grew as Mr. Imamoglu became more popular. Years of persistently high inflation, exacerbated by Mr. Erdogan\u2019s economic policies, have also made many Turks angry. <\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n And the benefits of an open election shrank, largely because of the geopolitical ripple effects from the re-election of President Trump, said Asli Aydintasbas, a visiting fellow at the Brookings Institution.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n The Trump administration does not appear to value the promotion of democracy abroad, and President Trump seems to have an affinity for authoritarian leaders like Mr. Putin. Additionally, waning U.S. support for NATO and defending Europe has made the continent more reliant on Turkey, which has the alliance\u2019s second-biggest military and a flourishing defense industry.<\/p>\n The result is that Mr. Erdogan has received very little criticism from allies in Europe and the United States who might once have opposed electoral manipulation or other undemocratic behavior. <\/p>\n \u201cPresident Erdogan has gambled on Turkey\u2019s rising influence and leverage in this particular geopolitical climate, and he may be right about that,\u201d Aydintasbas said.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n In Turkey, inflation and economic struggles have made it increasingly difficult for the government to maintain its popularity. That is due in part to the nature of competitive authoritarianism, which tends to reward loyalty over capability.<\/p>\n \u201cIncompetence makes it much more difficult to manage the economy in a way that would appeal to the people,\u201d said Selim Erdem Aytac, a political scientist at Koc University in Istanbul.<\/p>\n The government\u2019s arrests of Mr. Imamoglu and other opposition politicians and journalists have triggered a significant backlash. Protests that first broke out on university campuses have now spiraled into the largest demonstrations the country has seen in more than a decade, despite a crackdown by the government.<\/p>\n But it is not clear whether the protests have much capacity to make a difference. Years of democratic backsliding have insulated the government from many of the consequences of its heavy-handed rule. Such backsliding tends to be incremental and cumulative, which avoids triggering immediate public condemnation \u2014 but also makes that condemnation less effective when it eventually does come.<\/p>\n \u201cOnce you are at a stage where you think, \u2018Oh, that\u2019s not acceptable,\u2019 you don\u2019t have the tools to prevent it,\u201d Mr. Aytac said. \u201cThe judiciary is already captured. The media is already captured.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n Thank you for being a subscriber<\/strong><\/p>\n Read past editions of the newsletter here.<\/p>\n If you\u2019re enjoying what you\u2019re reading, please consider recommending it to others. They can sign up here. Browse all of our subscriber-only newsletters here.<\/p>\n I\u2019d love your feedback on this newsletter. Please email thoughts and suggestions to interpreter@nytimes.com. You can also follow me on Twitter<\/a>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\nSolving the authoritarian equation<\/h2>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n
The Trump effect<\/h2>\n
Authoritarian incompetence<\/h2>\n
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